Patent infringement awards are commonly feared to be unpredictable, and such unpredictability is decried as a significant problem in the patent system. We investigate the assumption that patent damages are unpredictable by conducting a large-scale econometric analysis of award values. We find a high degree of correlation between award value and ex ante-identifiable factors. We begin by analyzing the outcomes of 340 cases decided in US federal courts between 1995 and 2008 in which infringement was found and damages were awarded. Our data include the amount awarded, along with information about the litigants, case specifics and economic value of the patents-at-issue. Using these data, we construct an econometric model that explains over 75% of the variation in awards. We further conduct in-depth analysis of the key factors affecting award value, via targeted regressions involving fewer variables. Our findings refute claims that infringement awards are systematically unpredictable and, moreover, highlight the critical elements that can be expected to result in larger or smaller awards.
INTRODUCTION
Patent infringement awards are commonly feared to be unpredictable. Patents are often characterized as volatile assets with the potential to give rise to blockbuster awards and "bet-thecompany" liabilities. The most recent Federal Trade Commission report on the patent system highlights a "lottery ticket mentality" towards patent litigation outcomes.
1 Furthermore, the huge amounts spent on prosecuting and defending patent cases, assessed by the AIPLA to average $6.25 million in cases with over $25 million at issue, reflect both the expected stakes of patent litigation and the unpredictability of the resulting outcomes. 2 The assumption of unpredictability has also pervaded the policy debate and given rise to several reform measures. Before passage of the America Invents Act, the leading damages proposal sought to bolster the judge's role as the "gatekeeper" of evidence, 3 with the explicit aim of preventing jury errors and runaway verdicts. 4 Furthermore, case law developments preceding and following passage of the AIA, directed at restricting evidentiary rules and limiting factfinder discretion, are arguably intended to improve clarity and predictability of damage awards. 5 This study challenges the assumption that patent damages are unpredictable. We study the predictability of patent infringement awards over a 14-year period via regression analysis. We find that ex ante-observable factors of the litigants, case specifics and economic value of the patents-at-issue explain over 75% of the variation of the resulting infringement awards. We further study the significant factors influencing award value and compare them to factors known to influence rates of patent litigation.
In our study, we systematically catalogue the size of damage awards and explore factors that contribute to the observed dollar amount of awards. We analyze 340 patent infringement damage awards granted by a judge or jury in United States district courts from 1995 to 2008, using the economic value of patents as a benchmark. 6 These data were derived from a proprietary dataset owned by PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC") and licensed to us for use in this study. The PwC dataset, which informed the proposed patent reform legislation, 7 contains over 1,300 final patent decisions in US district courts from 1995 to 2008. We supplement the PwC dataset by reviewing the original case records for data regarding the damages theories used, asserted patents, procedural disposition, as well as venue and party characteristics. We then code these data for over 120 variables describing various aspects of the cases and awards. We analyze these data using regression analysis, seeking in the first stage to achieve maximum R-squared fit to the data, and other standard statistical methods. The result is a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the nature and characteristics of patent infringement damage awards in US district courts during this 14 year period. 8 Our key findings are as follows:
• The distribution of award levels is skewed, with a small number of very high dollar valued awards relative to the rest of the distribution. Specifically, the largest eight awards comprised over 47% of the aggregate awards amount over the time period studied.
• Infringement damages are highly predictable using the factors we included as explanatory variables. Our econometric model accounts for over 75% of variation across the dataset. 4 Senate Report on the patent reform Act of 2009 , S. Rep. 111-18, at 8 (May 12, 2009 ) ("damage awards . . . are too often excessive and untethered from the harm that compensatory damages are intended to measure").
5
See Section I(C), infra.
6
We refer to the economic literature on patent valuation to build a statistical model based on factors that have been shown to affect the economic value of patents. See note 184, infra, and accompanying text. See, e.g., 2009 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 9 n.40 (citing 2007 PwC Study).
8
Our analysis may miss some patent infringement damage awards from cases where relevant information was not reported (though we believe the impact on our conclusions to be minimal). Further, as the dataset only contains awards in US district courts before appeal, we cannot make definitive statements about the effect of the higher courts' decisions on final patent damage awards. Caveats regarding our findings are discussed further in our concluding section.
• Our analysis of significant factors influencing patent awards finds that the following tend to be associated with higher award values: o More patents per case; o More mature patents; o Patents with more claims and patents with more forward citations; o Patent-holders who manufacture and/or market the patented technology, as opposed to non-practicing entities; o Cases decided by juries; and o More complex cases (as measured by longer times to trial).
Section I analyzes the law of patent infringement damages, perceived problems and various proposals to address them, prior empirical studies of patent infringement damages, and recent relevant case law from the Federal Circuit and certain district courts. Section II outlines the research methodology employed in this article and presents descriptive statistics about the dataset. Section III provides the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section IV concludes by discussing policy implications and questions for future study.
I. BACKGROUND
This Section provides relevant background for our empirical analysis. Part A outlines the statutory and case law of patent infringement damages. Part B surveys previous empirical studies of patent infringement damages. Part C discusses recent federal case law regarding damages, and finally Part D explores certain implications of these decisions.
A. Summary of the Law of Patent Infringement Damages
A patent confers the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing the invention defined by its claims.
9 Section 284 of the Patent Act of 1952 provides damages for infringement of patent rights. Pursuant to Section 284, a successful claimant is entitled to receive "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer."
10 The statute affords no further explanation of the composition or calculation of compensatory damages, which has given rise to extensive litigation and a library of legal scholarship.
The two primary theories for awarding patent infringement damages are lost profits and reasonable royalties.
11 As its name suggests, lost profits awards the patentee 12 the profits that it lost as a result of the infringement. 13 To recover these damages, the claimant bears the burden of proving it is entitled to, and the amount of, lost profits.
14 By contrast, a claimant is entitled to a reasonable royalty upon proof of infringement, but nonetheless bears the burden of proving its claimed amount of reasonable royalty damages by a preponderance of evidence.
15 Properly construed, a reasonable royalty is merely "the floor below which damages shall not fall."
16 A claimant may elect whether to proceed on a theory of lost profits or claim reasonable royalty damages without seeking lost profits.
17

B.
Previous Lanjouw and Schankerman provide path-breaking analysis of the predictability of patent litigation and the litigation value of patents across several studies. In their 2001 study, they study the factors influencing litigation rates and win/loss/settlement outcomes. They identify certain patent characteristics lending to an increased likelihood of suit, most notably a higher number of claims and more forward citations per claim (so-called "valuable patents").
26
Additionally, certain litigant characteristics are found to influence litigation rates, such as the entity type and size of the patent owner.
27 They find that public companies are significantly less likely to file suits on patents they own than smaller, non-public companies and individuals.
2007 PwC Study
The 2007 PwC Study aggregated bench awards and jury verdicts in the years 1980 to 2005. It contained two findings relevant to the present focus. First, it found that median jury 18 Many of these studies were cited in the 2011 FTC Report as the "available statistics on patent litigation outcomes and damage awards." 2011 FTC Report, supra note 88, at 162. As described below, significant data gaps exist in this precedent. The 2008 PwC Study considers the incidence of bench versus jury decisions, finding "a marked increase in jury trials since the 1980s, with the shift becoming more evident since 1995." 33 The study attributes this increase to a "stark contrast" in plaintiff success rates between bench and jury trials, and median jury awards that are "significantly larger" than median bench awards. The study finds that " [j] In addition, the 2009 PwC Study considers the success rates at trial of NPEs versus practicing entities, and further distinguishes between success on summary judgment versus at trial. 45 The study finds that NPEs were successful 29 percent of the time overall, compared to a 41 percent success rate for practicing patent-holders. Whereas NPEs were slightly more successful than practicing entities at trial, they were successful on summary judgment only 12 percent of the time compared with a 20 percent success rate for practicing patent-holders. Lemley & Shapiro track the differences in royalty rates between different industries groups, and find variations in the average royalty rate awarded.
51 They conclude that "the reasonable-royalty rules do in fact accommodate component products but only to a limited extent."
52 They do not appear to consider the amounts of damage awards, what royalty base was used, or track the final outcomes after appeal.
6.
Allison 53 They further identified a random set of 106 once-litigated patents from the Clearinghouse data. The authors collected information about entity status, industry characteristics, and indicia of patent value (such as number of claims, forward-citations, and prior art citations).
54
The relevant findings of the Allison, Lemley & Walker study are noted as follows:
• Litigation Rates by Industry:
o Software and telecommunications patents are far more likely to be litigated, even over mechanical and chemical patents. o In particular, software-implemented business method patents comprise a large portion of the most-litigated patents group at 15%, compared to only 4% of oncelitigated patents. o Mechanical and electronics patents make up the bulk of the once-litigated patent cases at 53% and 25%, respectively. Conversely, they are of only minor significance in the most-litigated patent set at 8% for mechanical and 1% for electronics.
• Patent Owners:
o More than one-third of all litigated patents were sold to another owner after issue and before the lawsuit was filed. o Small entities that keep their patents rather than selling them tend to litigate less often than either large entities or purchasers of small entity patents. o Among the most-litigated patents, there are significantly more non-practicing entities than among the once-litigated patents.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 2031.
51
Id. at 2034-35.
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Id. at 2035. 58 His analysis finds that "damage awards are widely and stochastically distributed, which suggests that most cases are being adjudicated according to their facts rather than according to some predisposition towards large awards."
59
Opderbeck analyzes the distribution of patent infringement damage awards, finding a mean of $4.3M, median of $0.8M, standard deviation of $9.8M, and skewness of 3.97. 60 On this basis, Opderbeck concludes that "the range of awards varied widely . . . [suggesting] a lack of any pattern in the awards."
61 He further calculates the correlations between size of award and field of art. He finds "possibly significant" correlations with field of art of 0.36 (awards >= $500k), 0.54 (awards >= $1M), and 0.63 (awards >= $10M), but cautions that the sample sizes of the upper award tiers were small.
62
Notably, Opderbeck further studies the correlation between size of award and type of remedy (lost profits or reasonable royalty). He finds correlations of 0.12 (awards >= $500k), 0.01 (awards >= $1M), and 0.52 (awards >= $10M).
63 From this, Opderbeck concludes that the sample reveals "no overriding patterns to the awards, except for some varying degrees of correlation between the size of award and the field of art or type of remedy." 64 Opderbeck concludes that "the manner in which courts calculate reasonable royalty rates does not fundamentally cause any holdup and royalty stacking problems." 65 Instead, he suggests that "some facially shocking but mostly innocuous data are being used as the point of a much longer spear, which aims to redefine what kind of right a 'patent' represents." 
C. Recent Patent Damages Case Law
Several recent opinions, most issued in the 18 months prior to this article, have taken strides to reshape patent damages law and redress certain prevalent concerns. In particular, these cases have arguably heightened the standards for establishing reasonable royalty damages and instituted standards for more exacting scrutiny of jury verdicts. 67 1.
Lucent v. Gateway
In Lucent v. Gateway, a Federal Circuit panel vacated the jury's reasonable royalty award of $358 million for a minor component of Microsoft Office that was found to be infringing plaintiff's patent. 68 The issue on appeal was "whether substantial evidence supports the jury's implicit finding that Microsoft would have agreed to, at the time of the hypothetical negotiation, a lump-sum, paid-in-full royalty of about $358 million." The Court began by enumerating each of the Georgia-Pacific factors at issue and assessing the testimony and documentary evidence pertaining to each. 70 Principally relevant was the first factor, the "established royalty" for licensing the patents in suit. There, eight licenses that were accepted into evidence and used by the jury at trial were rejected as lacking "sufficient relevance"
71 to support the verdict. The jury had awarded a lump-sum royalty amount, but four of the licenses were based on running royalties and therefore were not comparable. 72 The other four licenses provided for lump-sum royalties but included additional material and arose under different circumstances than the hypothetical negotiation assumed, and therefore were not "sufficiently comparable." Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337 ("The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from this evidence is that the infringing use of Outlook's date-picker feature is a minor aspect of a much larger software program and that the portion of the profit that can be credited to the infringing use of the date-picker tool is exceedingly small."). mainly on speculation or guesswork." 74 Subsequent decisions have followed this mode of careful analysis of the "sufficiency" of evidence of prior licenses. 75 Notably, in closing, the Court also stated that to the extent the jury has applied the EMVR, this would have constituted legal error. 76 Though writing in dicta, the Court went to lengths to explore a long history of EMVR precedent, dating back to Garretson v. Clark in 1884. 77 The Court stressed the necessity for the plaintiff to establish applicability of the EMVR by demonstrating that that the patented feature constitute the "basis for customer demand." ResQNet v. Lansa
In ResQNet v. Lansa, a Federal Circuit panel vacated a bench damages award of $506,305 for infringement of a patent directed to a computer terminal emulation algorithm, which award was calculated by applying a hypothetical 12.5% royalty rate to the defendant's revenues from sales of the infringing software.
80 At the outset, the Court emphasized that the fact-finder "must carefully tie proof of damages to the claimed invention's footprint in the market place," 81 and cited its precedent for the rule that " [t] o prevent the hypothetical [negotiation] from lapsing into pure speculation, this court requires sound economic proof of the nature of the market and likely outcomes with infringement factored out of the economic picture."
82
In arriving at a 12.5% reasonable royalty rate, the plaintiff's expert used average royalty rates from two sets of prior licenses to the patents in suit and related technology. One set of prior licenses related to re-branding and re-bundling licenses which "furnished finished software products and source code, as well as services," 83 was rejected because the plaintiff had not shown that these licenses "embody or use the claimed technology" claimed by the patents in suit. 84 The other set were "straight" licenses to the patents in suit, which arose as settlements of prior litigation brought by the patentee. 85 The Court acknowledged that the settlement licenses could be admissible, but cautioned that even these must be scrutinized because settlement royalty rates may be too high (for example, "license fees negotiated in the face of a threat of high litigation costs may be strongly influenced by a desire to avoid full litigation" what parties in an ex ante hypothetical negotiation would reach. Rather, the Court stressed use of prior licenses under Georgia-Pacific factor 1 must account for the "technological and economic differences" between the licenses and the assumptions underlying the hypothetical negotiation. 88 3.
WordTech Systems v. Integrated Networks
In WordTech Systems v. Integrated Networks, a Federal Circuit panel reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial in light of a jury damages award of $250,000 for infringement of a patent directed to a device for copying video files from computer memory to multiple discs. 89 The jury award calculated damages as a lump sum royalty (as opposed to a running royalty on sales), 90 based on evidence of thirteen past licenses to the patents in suit. Notably, the Court reiterated the lessons of its Lucent and ResQNet precedent that when using past licenses to calculate a reasonable royalty damages award, the licenses in the record must be "sufficiently comparable" on the basis of the circumstances and technology involved in each 91 and the comparison "must account for the technological and economic differences" to the present case.
92 Turning to the licenses in the record, the Court scrutinized each, finding that the amounts agreed to therein were substantially lower than the royalty amount (with respect to the licenses involving a lump sum royalty) 93 or effective royalty rate (with respect to the licenses involving a running royalty) 94 awarded by the jury.
Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard
In Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard, Federal Circuit Chief Judge Rader, sitting by designation, granted the defendant's motion for judgment of a matter of law, and in the alternative offered the plaintiff remittitur, in a damages amount of $58,494,282.
95 Although the final award was still substantial, it was less than one third of the jury verdict of $184,044,048.
96
Notably, Judge Rader's opinion did not address the royalty rate at all, which was an uncontested and minimal 0.8%, and focused solely on the issue of apportionment as applied to HewlettPackard's sales of CPU brick products containing, as a relatively small though functionally advantageous and "important component"
97 thereof, an instruction-issuing mechanism that infringed Cornell's patent.
Chief Judge Rader first articulated the requirements for applying the EMVR in a reasonable royalty analysis. 98 Further, Chief Judge Rader explained that sufficient evidentiary proof of the applicability of the EMVR is a "demand curve [or] Another recent district court case authored by Chief Judge Rader sitting by designation took a similar approach, holding that the plaintiff "must show some plausible economic connection between the invented feature and the accused operating systems before using the market value of the entire product as the royalty base." 
5.
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.
Most recently, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., in which it rejected the long-standing "25% Rule of Thumb" for establishing a starting point for a reasonable royalty calculation. 103 The Rule was a common methodology used by plaintiffs' damages experts, whereby an initial royalty rate of 25% was assumed and casespecific factors were then applied to vary from that rate to arrive at a final number. In its opinion, the Court noted that while it had never squarely addressed admissibility of the Rule, the Federal Circuit has "passively tolerated its use where its acceptability has not been the focus of the case." 104 In premising its holding in the Daubert standard for expert evidence, the Court held the Rule to be inadmissible "because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue." 105 Explicitly, the Federal Circuit heavily relied and expanded on its precedent in Lucent, ResQNet and Wordtech in reaching its decision. The Court cited its precedent for the principle that "a patentee could not rely on license agreements that were 'radically different from the hypothetical agreement under consideration' to determine a reasonable royalty." 106 The Court emphasized that the "meaning of these cases is clear: there must be a basis in fact to associate the royalty rates used in prior licenses to the particular hypothetical negotiation at issue in the case."
107 Because the 25% Rule is "an abstract and largely theoretical construct [that] fails to satisfy this fundamental requirement," it was inadmissible as a tool for determining damages. 108 Notably, the Court also harkened back to recent decisions regarding the EMVR in the second part of its opinion. Addressing the issue of application of the EMVR, the Court 
D. Implications of Recent Patent Damages Case Law and Questions for Study
In sum, Uniloc and its predecessors appear to strike a new course regarding damage awards and their methodologies and evidentiary foundations. It remains to be seen whether this shift will be substantive as well as rhetorical in the long term. Currently, the broader impact of these decisions, both on appellate review of patent infringement damage awards and on initial admissibility decisions at trial, is not yet empirically observable. It is possible that a central cause of excessive patent damages, to the extent they existed, has been corrected by these decisions. Or, these cases may have no long-term impact.
It is clear, however, that the Federal Circuit bench is taking an active role in reviewing patent damage awards and is seeking to clarify the rules for their determination at trial. To the extent problems with damages behave idiosyncratically, case-specific correction may be the most effective remedy.
110 Or, the opposite might be true. Since statutory changes operate differently than the organic evolution of case-by-case precedent, legislative patent reform might be more effective at fixing current problems in patent damage awards. Which fork should be taken depends on what, in fact, these problems are. That is, the nature of the appropriate remedy depends on the diagnosis of the problem.
More precisely, if excessive patent damages are found to behave idiosyncratically, then case-by-case correction of such individual errors and establishment of precedent to prevent their recurrence under analogous circumstances may be the best approach. However, if excessive damages are a systematic problem, legislative changes that would categorically impact all patent cases may be more effective. Or, as a third alternative, if excessive damages are systematically found across a subset of patent awards with identifiable characteristics, legislative or judicial approaches (or a combination of both) may be appropriate to target the problem. In this third case, identifying the characteristics in question will be key.
109
Id. at *51. 
II. Data
This study builds a comprehensive dataset of patent awards and attempts, to the extent possible given available information, to systematically characterize the distribution of damage awards. In addition, we construct a series of variables from a variety of sources that are subsequently used to predict and explain the size of awards in the dataset. This section of the paper discusses the dataset construction and provides a first glimpse of the information we have analyzed. We emphasize some interesting patterns in the raw data in this section, before presenting regression analyses in the next section.
A. Dataset
To start, our analysis requires comprehensive information about damage awards in litigated patent cases. As part of its intellectual property (IP) dispute analysis practice, which provides IP litigation and valuation services, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) has collected an extensive database on the complete set of patent case final rulings and damage awards as reported by Westlaw. Information in the PwC database includes party names, the industry of the potential infringer, whether the patent holder is a non-practicing entity, the presiding court at the time of the decision, the deciding body (bench or jury), the year of decision, the time to trial, and the associated damage awards with their component parts (where available). PwC updates its dataset every year and uses it to issue an annual report on statistics and trends in patent litigation and damages.
111 PwC licensed to us the proprietary dataset underlying their reports for the years 1995 through 2008 to start the process of building the dataset for this study. We carefully investigated each of the cases identified in PwC's original database to determine the nature of the intellectual property at issue and to verify that damage awards pertaining to the same litigated case were appropriately combined. After making a series of data cleaning changes, this process yielded a final case information database that is summarized in Figure 1 .
111
The most recent PwC studies are available at: http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/patent-litigation-study.jhtml. The PwC annual reports were often cited in the patent reform debates that preceded the passage of the America Invests Act.
FIGURE 1 Description of the Final Case Information Database 1995 -2008
A total of 1,331 cases were identified, of which the trial court ruled there was infringement in 439. Among these, courts awarded damages in 340 cases -with post-judgment settlement by the parties being the most common reason no award data was found. These 340 cases represent the set of observations examined in this analysis, with the identified total damages award level representing the main dependent variable of interest. 112 The level of some of these awards may well have changed on post-trial review and appeal; however, attention is focused only on the initial damage awards granted at the district court level. 113 In other words,
112
The 340 cases include those involving Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) where lost profits and reasonable royalties are not available remedies. To avoid losing these cases in the regression analysis they are coded as having $0 award (if there were no costs awarded). Because some total damages amounts include costs that cannot be separated out, all total awards include costs and attorneys fees, where available. Further, seven non-ANDA cases have a true award of $0. In these cases, the trier-of-fact determined that the patent holders did not bear their burden of proof on damages.
113
To be clear, we define awards based on the trier of fact in the case. For cases decided by a jury, the base amounts are those awarded in the jury verdict. For cases decided by a judge, the base amounts are the those in the final judgments. Base awards are for direct infringement only (including price erosion and convoyed sales where awarded). They do not include appeals or, in the case of jury awards, remittiturs by the bench. Where available, associated interest and enhanced damages for willfulness are added to the base amounts to arrive at the total award. the damage awards in our dataset may have been changed during the appeals process, but these changes are not reflected in our current analysis. 114 To compare across years, we used the Consumer Price Index to translate damage awards levels from their nominal amounts into 2008 dollars.
B.
Characteristics of the Award Distribution Figure 2 displays the count of observations in the datatset by year of decision, from 1995 through 2008.
FIGURE 2
This graphic representation underlines the fact that on a year-by-year basis, the number of patent damage awards granted is quite small. As a consequence -and particularly since one or two large awards can skew these distributions substantially -one should be careful to not attribute too much significance to differences in observed damages from year to year. 115 In fact,
114
Future analysis may study the changes in awards due to the appeals process. wWhen controlling for the year of the decision in some of the regressions below it can be shown that an independent time trend has very littleno power in explainingis negatively correlated with damages award amounts.
116
To facilitate comparison with previous studies, annual summaries of the distributions of awards in the dataset are presented. Table 12 provides a more complete picture of these distributions, by including the quartiles as well as medians.
117 Taking 2004 as an example, after adjusting the awards to 2008 dollars, the lowest award that year was $40,000 and the highest award that year was $175.1 million. In between those amounts though, 25% of the awards were under $540,000, 50% of the awards were under $4.3 million, and 75% of the awards were under $29.0 million. The other annual distributions behave in similar fashion. Furthermore, the small number of patent infringement cases in which damages are awarded may give reason to question the hyperbolic claims by some that patent litigation damages have significant deleterious effects on research and development activities in the United States. Figure 3 shows the differences in the median and average damages awards by year.
FIGURE 3
Although there is an underlying stability of the median over time, the increasing skewness of the awards data is evident from Table 2 and Figure 3 -for example, when they occur, outliers generate large differences between the average and the median award levels in particular years. Taken together, Table 2 and Figure 3 also demonstrate an underlying stability of the distribution over time. This lack of annual variation motivates a description of the characteristics of the entire distribution of awards over the whole time period for which data is available.
A straightforward graphical presentation of the entire awards distribution is shown in Figure 4 .
FIGURE 4
Figure 4 is a histogram of awards, broken down into increasing award-level categories. Across the dataset, 74 of the cases have damage awards of less than $500,000, representing 24.2 percent of all cases during the time period. Reading from left to right in the figure, 49 cases have award values between $500,000 and $2 million; 34 between $2 and $5 million; 33 between $5 and $10 million, 42 between $10 and $25 million, 29 between $25 and $50 million, 26 between $50 and $100 million and 11 between $100 and $200 million. Of particular note in Figure 4 is the very last bar on the right, representing damage awards of over $200 million. A total of eight cases fall into this highest category of damage awards, which represents 2.4 percent of the number of all awards during the 1995 through 2008 period.
It is not surprising that these damage awards in the upper tail of the distribution would attract so much attention. As compared to the overall distribution, they are quite large. Indeed, we find that together, these eight cases represent 47.6 percent of the collective damages in all the non-ANDA cases from 1995 until 2008. These raw data suggest that focusing on these very large values may obscure the true nature of the overall distribution of the damage awards. In contrast to the suggestion put forward by policy makers prior to the enactment of the America Invests Act, 118 our systematic analysis of the entire distribution reveals that the largest awards are not "the tip of the iceberg" of excessive patent damage awards. Instead, these very large awards appear to be true outliers, as compared to the rest of the distribution.
While more details about the determination of awards will be discussed in the regression analysis described below, a descriptive analysis of the underlying distribution of damage awards is revealing about concerns regarding the unpredictability of patent damage awards. Cutting the data several ways shows that the distribution exhibits a great deal of skewness; a very small number of very large damage awards are not representative of what has happened across all cases. This may yet be another example of the behavioral bias that occurs when individuals "overreact" to the very low probability, but very bad outcomes.
119 Nonetheless, it is notable that such awards are indeed very large as compared with the rest of the distribution.
C. Explanatory Variables
To complement the damage awards information, we also assembled various series of data that could potentially explain the level of damages in each case. All the explanatory variables used are summarized in Table 2 and can be divided into three separate categories. 120 The first category is information derived from the record in each individual case, with key factors such as whether the case was decided by a judge or a jury and whether a lost profit or a reasonable royalty damages theory was utilized in determining the level of the award, if available.
The second category of variables represents information about the litigants in each case. This includes the identity of both the plaintiff and the defendant in each case-i.e., if it is an individual, a firm, a government entity or a nonprofit organization. The corporate litigants are further broken down into various industry categories and by firm size.
The third category of variables draws on the economic literature of patent value mentioned above. These data include publicly available information on various characteristics of patents, including information about their assignees, number of claims, and counts of their citations in subsequent patents. Economists have argued that patents embodying more substantial intellectual property often have more claims and are cited more often by later patents.
121 By including number of claims or appending citation information to the data for each case, it can be determined whether a particular measure of a patent's value is associated with the court's determination of infringement award levels.
All of the case identification and variable coding are limited to the information that could be found in Westlaw, Lexis, PACER, and the NBER patent database, in addition to information on websites like Google, Manta, Hoover's Online, Fortune, and EDGAR (for company SEC filings). 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Analysis of Overall Predictability
Using the dataset described in the section above, we first attempt to determine whether patent damage awards are predictable based on ex ante factors. Because our dataset does not contain the outcome of every patent case filed, we cannot yet create a model to predict the expected value of damages from the outset of a case. However, we can develop a model that explains damages conditional on the patent being found valid and infringed and the parties not settling. In future research, we plan to delve more deeply into the expected value of a filed patent case.
The regression analyses presented below attempt to determine how much of the variation in patent damage awards can be explained by the factors we assembled regarding the cases, litigants and patents-at issue. Using all 340 patent damage awards, 123 we ran several models to see which collection of factors could best be used to explain the variation in observed patent damages from 1995 through 2008. Because the dependent variable remains the same for most of the models, the R-squared goodness of fit measure can be used to compare the different models. The summary statistics from the models of best fit are outlined in Table 3 .
TABLE 3 Summary of Models That Explain Patent Damage Awards 124
Model (1) in Table 3 is our "naïve" model that contains almost all of the variables listed in Appendix 1 as controls. Because of the skewness inherent in the distribution of damages, the dependent variable is the log of damages in 2008 dollars. This transformation is necessary to normalize damages and allow for a better predicting model, as we will show. Also, to minimize multicollinearity that could artificially increase the R-squared goodness of fit measure, the 123 In order to compare all patent infringement cases, ANDA cases are included with $0 damages amounts in the regression. In most of the regressions fewer than 340 cases are used in the model due to missing data.
124
Full regression results are on file with the authors. #&@AB(8#CD(8;>? --9 --9 --9 --9 --9 -3--3- control variables were tested to ensure none were highly correlated with any other. For pairs of controls that were highly correlated, the one of the pair most correlated with the log of damages (the dependent variable) was retained. Robust standard errors were also used to mitigate any heteroscedasticity in the model.
This naïve model does quite well as it explains about 64 percent of the variation in the observed patent damage awards, as represented by an R-squared of 0.6399. 125 However, we thought it was possible to create an even better model by adding in or creating additional controls. In order to most effectively use the data to generate additional explanatory power, we conducted a variety of detailed manipulations on several of the variables. For example, we constructed interaction terms for certain key variables. As an illustration, the data contains information about who decided damages (judge or jury) in each case and the particular damages theory (lost profits or reasonable royalties) utilized. Based on these individual indicator variables, we created, for example, interaction variables for cases decided by juries using the reasonable royalty standard. We also considered nonlinear representations of some regressors. The remaining models in Table 3 show how each modification improved the overall predictability of patent damage awards. Table 3 is the naïve model plus an additional control for whether the case was an ANDA case. Because ANDA cases generally have $0 awards, as a group they are different from standard patent infringement cases. Rather than drop these observations, we chose to control for them in Model (2). This addition immediately increased the explanatory power of the model as represented by its R-squared of 0.7340 (adjusted R-squared = 0.6566).
Model (2) in
none of the years are individually significant so the time trend itself does not have much predictive power. This model as a whole explains 76 percent of the variation in patent damage awards (adjusted R-squared = 0.6618).
Finally, Model (6) takes Model (5) and adds a variable tracking the average number of forward citations for the patents-at-issue in the case. Allison, et al. originally linked the number of forward citations to the likelihood of patent litigation 126 and forward citations as a proxy for the inherent economic value of patents appears to hold in this model as well. Model (6) explains about 77 percent of the variation in patent damages (adjusted R-squared = 0.6696). However, we note that forward citations, gathered from the NBER patent database, were not available for all cases and so had to drop 25 cases due to lack of data.
Remarkably, the statistical models that we constructed includes sets of regressors that explains between 64 and 77 percent of the variation in the observed patent damage awards. This result suggests that infringement damages are very predictable based on the dimensions represented by our data.
127 It is worth noting that the dependent variable in Models (1) -(6) reported in Table 3 is the log of damage awards. The skewness in the underlying damages data suggests this was a necessary transformation to determine a model of best fit since patent damages are not determined by a straight line (especially as they get larger).
128 Linear versions using the same regressors would have much less explanatory power. For example, Model (7) in Table 3 is simply Model (6) but with the straight patent damage amounts, i.e. without the log transformation. This model does far worse than any of the others (R-squared = 0. 4457 and Adjusted R-squared = 0.2030). These findings contrast with the suggestion in the Opderbeck study that there is no clear pattern to the observed damage awards. See Opderbeck, supra note 100, at 149.
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It is not uncommon to use log transformations on the dependent variable in order to put the relationship between the dependent and independent variables into a linear form. The appropriateness of logging the dependent variable can also be determined by graphing the residuals of the model. Here the residuals are normally distributed, suggesting that our model is appropriate.
B. Key factors explaining patent damage awards
While the previous model focuses on the overall predictability of patent damage award levels based on observable factors, the relatively large number of regressors and the presence of interaction and higher-order terms complicates interpretation of individual explanatory factors. In this subsection, we present a streamlined version of the regression analysis, with regressors specifically chosen to assess various economic factors that may be associated with damage awards. In addition, we evaluate the role of certain litigation strategy and case-related variables that may also affect damage award levels.
The regression results are presented in Table 4 . Again, the dependent variable of the regression is the natural logarithm of observed patent damage awards. Note that the number of observations in this dataset is somewhat smaller, as several cases needed to be dropped due to incomplete data for some of the important explanatory variables. Despite the much smaller number of explanatory variables (just ten) in this regression, the overall fit of the regression remains relatively strong.
The focus of this empirical exercise, however, is on the significance of the individual regressors. We start at the top of table 4 with four variables regarding the patents at issue in the decided cases. The number of patents varies by case (ranging from one to twenty-nine patents), and these results indicate that cases with more patents tend to have higher damage award values, all else equal. This factor had particularly high statistical significance, with a t-statistic of 4.99.
The next three explanatory variables capture features of the patents in each of the cases for which damages were awarded. Since there may be several patents associated with a given case, we included averages for each of these features calculated across the patents in that case. For example, based on the issue date of the patent and the time of the decision, we determined the age of each patent associated with the case and computed the average among all these patents. Again, the coefficient on average patent age is positive and statistically significant. Cases associated with more mature patents -perhaps those for which infringement would have generated a higher level of lost profits -do have a correspondingly higher level of damage award values.
The remaining two variables are meant to proxy for the inherent economic value associated with the patents-at-issue in the cases. For each case, we have computed the average claims made by the relevant patents; our hypothesis is that patents with more claims should cover more intellectual property. The resulting damage awards were indeed higher in cases where the patents had more claims, potentially reflecting a higher royalty rate or greater amount of lost profits related to more intellectual property. The significance of the intellectual property associated with patents is often captured by the number of times the patent is cited in other patents granted in the future. Our regression results support this interpretation as well, as damages are higher in cases where the average patent is cited more often in future patents. The regression coefficients on both the patent claims and forward citations variables are statistically significant.
TABLE 4 Significant Factors Influencing Damage Awards
The next set of reported coefficients is associated with the litigants involved in the cases. Unfortunately, we do not have specific information about the infringing activity that would allow us to directly measure lost profits or reasonable royalties on a case-by-case basis. We instead use variables associated with the size and revenue potential of defendants to proxy for the scope of what these damage values might be. We include dummy variables indicating cases where the defendant is a public company (as opposed to a private company, an individual or a government organization) and another dummy variable for those companies that are in the Fortune 500 (the 500 largest companies by revenue in the United States). Both of these dummy variables are positive, though only the public company proxy is statistically significant at traditional precision levels. Though these proxies are imperfect, these findings do provide some consistent evidence regarding revenue potential.
On the plaintiff side, we wanted to see whether there was a difference between litigants that were in business potential producing products based on their patents and so-called "nonpracticing entities" (NPEs) who own patents and may assert rights even if they are not involved in associated commercial activity. Our proxy for this takes the form of a dummy variable (assembled by PwC) that equals one in cases where the patent holder manufactures and/or markets the technology associated with the patent. The regression results indicate that damage awards are higher in cases with such patent holders, though the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. A positive result is not surprising, given that the nature of NPEs makes it difficult for them to assert a lost profits damages argument. Nonetheless, this result is worthy of further examination -in future work, we plan to investigate the role of NPEs in damage awards in greater depth.
The last set of variables in the regression focus on litigation-related factors, including case strategy choices that may be affected by litigants. We included a dummy variable for cases that were decided by juries; such cases were associated with significantly higher damage awards. Patent reform proponents cited case complexity and jury inexperience as contributors to "excessive" awards; our results do indicate higher awards in jury cases (though it is difficult to argue that the awards are "excessive" based on these results). We also include a time-to-trial variable that equals the number of days between the initial complaint and the date of the decision. While there are a variety of potential explanations for why the time to trial might be longer, we believe it may proxy for the complexity of cases -with more complex cases having potentially higher damages at stake.
Finally, we included the year of the decision in the regression to control for any time trend in the damage award amounts. Interestingly, the estimated time trend is significantly negative here, indicating that all else equal damage awards have been decreasing over time. To the extent that observed damage award values may have been increasing, the results suggest that this is more due to changes in the kinds of cases involved (as captured by our control variables) as opposed to any general independent trend toward greater awards. Indeed, to the extent there is an independent time trend it appears to be moving in the opposite direction.
IV. INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
To be completed.
